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robber could be guilty of murder when his partner in the crime
was killed by their victim, shows what hard results a court
thinking in terms of "proximate cause" may reach. In the
writer's opinion the "act or constructive act" rule furnishes
adequate protection to the public and is the wiser rule for a case
that does not fall into the "shield" category.
Now that the instant case has been added to Louisiana jurisprudence, the result reached in subsequent cases in Louisiana
should be the same as that reached by a common law court following the "act or constructive act" rule.15 The case does not,
however, make clear what result would be reached in a "shield"
situation. It might be logically held that a felon who intentionally forced an innocent person into a position where there
was a high danger of his death at the hand of one resisting the
felony was as much an "actual killer" as was the person who
inflicted the lethal injury. Considerations of social policy wouldseem to dictate such a conclusion.
Robert Butler III

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-

VENUE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

PROSECUTING PARISH

Defendant, a member of the Board of Commissioners of the
Pontchartrain Levee District, which is domiciled in St. James
Parish, was indicted for public bribery' in that parish. Upon a
stipulation of facts by the district attorney admitting that no
offer, acceptance, receipt, or deposit of anything of value was
made in the parish, the defense moved to quash the information
because of improper venue. It was argued that the offense was
not committed in St. James Parish and, moreover, that the proground that the killing of an escaping robber by his victim or a police officer
was "justifiable," while the accidental killing of one policeman by another engaged
in a gun battle with robbers was "excusable." This seems a poor basis for distinction. The court might have done better to hold the felony murder rule not
applicable to a case where the deceased was a felon, justifying this conclusion
on the ground that the doctrine developed as a means of protecting the innocent
public.
15. If the defendant inflicts the fatal injury himself, he is covered by the
phrase "actual killer." If his accomplice does the killing, he can still be held for
the homicide under LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950). It should be noted that the phrase
"when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration"
appears in both the murder and manslaughter articles, so the result reached in
the instant case should also be reached in a murder case.
1. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950) provides that the "acceptance of, or the offer to
accept, directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present or prospective value
[from named persons with the intent to influence the person's conduct in relation
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vision of R.S. 15:132 establishing venue in any one of the various
parishes where a "substantial element" of the crime was committed was not satisfied. The state argued that the defendant's
conduct in relation to his official position held in the prosecuting
parish made the offense complete in that parish. However, the
district court held that it was without venue over the crime. On
appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The
offense of public bribery is complete upon the giving or acceptance of a thing of value, or an offer thereof, when accompanied
with the requisite intent. Since none of these elements occurred
in St. James Parish, the district court did not have venue over
the crime. State v. Bloomenstiel, 235 La. 860, 106 So.2d 288
(1958).
. In accordance with the requirement of Article I, Section 9,
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, 3 R.S. 15:13 provides that
a trial shall be held in the parish where the offense was committed, unless the venue be changed. The statute was amended
in 19424 to provide, in addition, that where several acts constituting a crime have been committed in more than one parish,
the offender may be tried in any parish where a substantial
element of the crime was committed. Prior to the amending of
the present venue article, there was no provision for multielement crimes which spread over several parishes. 5 Offenses
against the person and those composed of a single criminal eleto his position, employment, or duty] shall also constitute public bribery." LA.
CONST. art. XIX, § 12, further defines bribery and provides for disqualification
from public office upon conviction. Section 13 provides that any person may be
compelled to testify in such proceedings and the privilege against self-incrimination will not apply. However, such testimony shall only be used against the witness in perjury proceedings. For history of prior statutes, see Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 6, 45 (1942).

2. Formerly La. Acts 1928, No. 2, as amended, La. Acts 1942, No. 147.
3. Wherein it is stated that "all trials shall take place in the parish in which
the offense was committed, unless the venue be changed."
4. This amended article was preceded by La. Acts 1855, No. 121, later incorporated into LA. R.S. § 988 (1870), which provided for prosecution in either
parish when the offense was begun in one parish and ended in another. However,
in State v. Montgomery, 115 La. 155, 38 So. 949 (1905), a section of the act
relating to crimes committed within 100 yards of the parish line was held unconstitutional under the 1864 provision that trials shall be held in the parish where
the offense was committed. See La. Const. art. 105 (1864)
La. Const. art. 6
(1868); La. Const. art. 7 (1879); La. Const. art. 9 (1898); La. Const. art. 9
(1913) LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (1921). The provision relating to crimes beginning
and ending in different parishes was held objectionable in State v. Moore, 140
La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916). This decision was questioned, however, in State v.
Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940), with the resulting enactment of La. Acts
1942, No. 147.
5. An exception was made in LA. CONST. art. I, § 9, to allow the legislature
to provide for the prosecution and venue of offenses committed within one hundred
feet of the boundary line of a parish.
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ment are often completed in one parish and the venue rules are
easily satisfied. Offenses involving fraudulent schemes and the
use of modern communication and transportation devices are
often spread over several parishes and states. This gives rise to
the problem of pointing to the exact situs of the crime and thus
determining the district court of proper venue. Numerous cases
reached the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1940 involving crimes
of a political nature and this tribunal, faced with the constitutional directive, was hard put to find the parish where the "gist"
of the offense was committed. In a prosecution for violation of
the "dead-head" statute, the defendant could only be tried in the
parish where he received and cashed his check from the public
treasury.6 Where a state senator accepted a second public office
and continued receiving payment for the first office, East Baton
Rouge Parish (where it was held that the duties of state senator
were performed and the emoluments therefor received) was
vested with venue over the crime to the exclusion of the parish
where the defendant was domiciled and cashed the check representing payment for the first office. 7 Operation of a confidence
game to receive money or property was found analogous to obtaining a gain through false pretenses and the parish where the
money or property was received was the parish in which the
defendant could be correctly prosecuted for the offense, although the fraudulent scheme was devised and overt acts
in its commission were accomplished elsewhere." Thus, it is
readily perceived that in attempting to determine where the
"gist" of the crime was committed, the courts were confronted
with uncertain criteria and as the number of elements going to
make up the completed crime increased, the determination became frustrating.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has construed the liberal venue
provision of 1942 in several cases, each involving the question of
whether a "substantial element" of the offense was committed
in the parish initiating the action and thus, whether the constitutional mandate has been satisfied. In State v. Pollard,9 the
defendant was alleged to have perpetrated a theft of public highway funds which were allocated for road construction in Caldwell Parish. The state, urging venue in that parish, asserted
that the road was wholly within the parish; that the materials
6.
7.
8.
9.

State v.
State v.
State v.
215 La.

Matheny, 194 La. 198, 193 So. 587 (1940).
Terzia, 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940).
Hart, 195 La. 184, 196 So. 62 (1940).
655, 41 So.2d 465 (1949).

19601

NOTES

were omitted and the shortage resulted therein; that the project
engineer's records, alleged to be falsified, were kept there; and
that the partial estimate, under which the alleged fraud was
perpetrated, was made in and sent from that parish. In denying
venue for the prosecuting parish, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stressed the fact that the Department of Public Highways' offices were located in Baton Rouge and thus the false estimates
were received, and the check was issued on and drawn from
accounts in East Baton Rouge Parish. It was stated that the
offense was consummated in Baton Rouge and that the facts
relied upon by the state were "merely the preparation of a
fraudulent scheme"' 1 which did not meet the requirements of
R.S. 15:13, as amended. This venue rule was not satisfied even
with evidence of acts committed in Caldwell Parish which were
indispensable to the completion of the alleged offense. Thus, no
substantial element of the crime was found to have existed in the
parish most concerned with correcting the mis-appropriation.
In State v. Ellerbe," the problem was whether a prosecution for
receiving stolen things could be effected in the parish into which
the goods were taken after having been received elsewhere. In
sustaining a motion by the defense, the court pointed out that in
the absence of a showing that there was concealment and possession in the second parish, it would not be vested with venue
over the crime. 1 2 The operati6n of a motor vehicle by an individual while under the influence of an intoxicant was held to be
a continuing offense when the uninterrupted journey was commenced in one parish and ended in another. 13 A substantial
element of the offense was supplied in each parish, thus vesting
both with venue. It should be noted that under these circumstances, the "substantial element" test was unnecessary because
the continuing offense of drunken driving was complete in both
of the parishes. R.S. 15:13, as amended, was also found useful
in determining the parish of proper venue in another case where
the defendant, under prosecution for criminal neglect of family,
resided elsewhere and his children were domiciled in the prosecuting parish under the care of their maternal grandmother. 4
10. 215 La. 655, 665, 41 So.2d 465, 468 (1949).
11. 217 La. 639, 47 So.2d 30 (1950).
12. The court refused to apply the legal concept of a continuing crime which
has enjoyed varied application in theft cases. Originating in England, this fiction
has been accepted by a majority of American courts. In State v. McCoy, 42 La.
Ann. 228, 7 So. 330 (1890), the court said: "When the larceny has been committed in one county (animo furandi) the offender is, in the eye of the law, guilty
of larceny in every county into which the goods may have been carried."
13. State.v. Sawyer, 220 La. 932, 57 So.2d 899 (1952).
14. State v. Maxie, 221 La. 518, 59 So.2d 706 (1952).
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Although the decision turned largely upon the application of a
special venue provision, 5 the court mentioned the general venue
article in support of its holding and found a substantial element
of the offense to have been committed in the parish asserting
venue.
In the instant case no "substantial element" of the charged
offense was committed in the prosecuting parish. The state's
argument that the official position held by the defendant in
St. James Parish gave rise to an element of the crime in that
parish was termed "nebulous" by the court. This was merely a
relationship existing in the parish and could not be considered
an act or element going to make up the completed crime. The
court stated that corruption of the mind resulting from the offer
might, and most likely would, lead to official misconduct in the
future, and hence the first step is made criminal, without waiting for the results.
It is submitted that no other disposition of the case was possible even under a most liberal application of the statute. Future
cases will doubtless further clarify the substantial element requirement and define the distinction between substantial elements on the one hand, and incidental or collateral elements on
the other. This will necessarily depend upon the complexity of
the elements going to make up the completed offense. A preliminary draft of the Louisiana State Law Institute's Revised
Code of Criminal Procedure eliminates the term "substantial"
from the article, and makes "any act or element" of the crime
sufficient to vest the parish where it was committed with
venue. 16 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the holding in the
instant case would be sustained even under a rule requiring "any
act or element" of the crime in the prosecuting parish. The offense of public bribery was complete upon the offer being made,
when coupled with the required intent.
John S. Campbell, Jr.
15. LA. R.S. 15:16.1 (1950) provides for prosecution "(1) in the parish where
the person owing the duty of support resides or is found, or (2) in the parish
where the last matrimonial domicile was established, or (3) in the parish where
the person. (or persons) to whom the duty of support is owed establishes a bona
fide residence, provided that this provision shall be effective only if the person to
whom the duty of support was owed was justified in establishing a separate residence."
16. Title XIX, Art. 1 (October 1959 draft). A constitutional amendment may
also be necessary in order that the proposed change will not conflict with LA.
CoNST. art. I, § 9.

